* Rewrite intro, main argument, and test logic using simple language that Reviewer 1 used
* Rewrite main argument in less abstract way + more specific examples of what selective manipulation could look like
* ~~Add argument that local performance of local officials may matter beyond its impact on dissent~~
  + ~~E.g. disloyal elites may lead to coup (Svolik 2013), may even compete with regimes for popularity, develop their own powerbase~~
  + ~~Incompetent elites may lead to leakage and inefficiencies, prevent govt. from achieving its goals~~
  + ~~Note that Malesky and Schuler 2011 are not exhaustive in saying that local performance matters because of dissent~~
* **~~Add a section on generalizability~~**
  + ~~Emphasize the fact that the specifics of the test may vary across different countries but the basic ingredients are common~~
    - ~~Generally in authoritarian regimes, vote results often require efforts or competence of local agents, so this is always given~~
    - ~~Generally, it is not uncommon for vote results even at local levels to potentially send signal about central approval~~
      * ~~In presidential systems, votes for the incumbent are obvious~~
      * ~~Even when there is no perfect separation between central and local candidates, all actors may still have good information to determine the alignment of certain candidates if they need to~~
        + ~~Example: “good types” vs “governance types” in China~~
        + ~~Example: in electoral autocracies like Uganda, voters can tell between incumbent party candidates who are favored by the party and incumbent party candidates who did not secure the approval of the party primary~~
    - ~~It is less common but not impossible for vote results to~~ *~~only~~* ~~provide information about either central approval or performance/efforts of local agents~~
      * ~~This requires that regimes reasonably expect vote results to~~ *~~not~~* ~~be informative about other things~~
        + ~~E.g. individual candidates’ performance~~

~~Generally, idea of “hierarchical trust” (citation TK) suggest it’s possible for voters to evaluate individual, local candidates and central level executives through different lens >> potential issue~~

~~In Vietnam, this is possible because candidates get shuffled, and because defeats are not at the hand of the most popular competitor but often a lesser ranked local competitor who barely made it~~

In many other systems, closed-list PR (example – TK) or heavily restricted campaigns (Singapore) may achieve the same

* + - * ~~As this can be achieved through selective manipulation, the presence of selective manipulation is a good indicator for whether this test is applicable~~
  + ~~More generally, depending on the specific case, which motivations for authoritarian elections (and which theories of authoritarian elections) that are at stake may differ. As a result the specifics of the test may differ.~~
    - ~~Depends on information needs of the regime (also what information institution is available). This requires case knowledge~~
    - ~~Depends on what selective manipulation is available. This also requires case knowledge.~~
    - ~~Key ingredient is surprising, localized defeats that are costly, but nonetheless tolerated by the regime~~
      * ~~Operationalization may differ, but substantively the same~~
        + ~~E.g. defeats vs. low vote shares vs. big swings~~
        + ~~In both super secure regimes like Vietnam or electoral autocracies, surprising defeats are possible~~

~~Even in democracies too!~~

* + ~~Overall framework~~
    - ~~Identify the regime’s information needs~~
    - ~~Identify potential candidate motivations based on the regime’s manipulation strategies~~
    - ~~Identify surprising and thus informative localized election defeats~~
    - ~~Consider responses to localized election defeats and see what motivations are most consistent.~~
  + ~~Key contribution of the framework~~
    - ~~Rigorous case-level test of theories of authoritarian elections~~
      * ~~Leverage case knowledge and case-specific empirical tests~~
    - ~~Important because cross-national regressions e.g. (Miller 2015) omit potential heterogeneity~~
* ~~More illustrative details on cases~~
  + ~~For some cases of defeat, narratives about how the defeats happened~~
    - ~~E.g. Can Tho~~
* ~~Add clarifying details about empirics~~
  + ~~Move details about number of cases, provinces, observations further up~~
* ~~Clarify that local officials who manage the elections and get evaluated by election results are NOT the same candidates running elections~~
* ~~Add citation for “large and penetrating security apparatus” in Vietnam~~
* ~~Fix citation for Geddes (2018) and Jensen and Malesky (2018) to both be chapters in a co-authored book~~